








02-22The Wharton Financial Institutions Center
The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for
competitive excellence.  The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk
at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center.  The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as
they pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center.  If you would
like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please
let us know of your interest.
Franklin Allen Richard J. Herring
Co-Director Co-Director
The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous










New York, NY 10003
Douglas.Gale@nyu.edu
April 2002
1Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and World Bank Group￿s
Conference on ￿Asset Price Bubbles: Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and
International Policies￿ in Chicago on April 22-24, 2002.Abstract
The eﬀect of stock market interlinkages on asset price bubbles are considered.
Bubbles can occur when there is an agency problem between banks and the
people they lend money to because the banks cannot observe how the funds
are invested. This causes a risk shifting problem and asset prices are bid up
above their fundamental. The greater is uncertainty about asset returns or
about the amount of aggregate credit the greater is the bubble. Stock market
interlinkages can moderate or exacerbate asset price bubbles.1 Introduction
Stock market interlinkages have played an important role in the formation
and collapse of bubbles from early times. For example, Carswell (1960)
describes the links between the 1719 bubble in the stock of the Mississippi
Company in Paris and the 1720 bubble in the stock of the South Sea Company
in London. There were signi￿cant ￿ows between the ￿nancial centers as these
bubbles in￿ated and burst. Similarly, there were also ￿ows between London
and Paris and other ￿nancial centers in Europe such as Amsterdam and asset
price movements were interdependent.
In more recent times stock market interlinkages also appear to play an
important role in asset price bubbles. Higgins and Osler (1997) consider
18 OECD countries and document a signi￿cant simultaneous rise in real
estate and stock prices during the period 1984-89. These prices subsequently
fell during the period 1989-1993. Regression results indicate a 10 percent
increase in real residential real estate prices above the OECD average in
1984-1989 was associated with an 8 percent steeper fall than average in 1989-
1993. Similarly, for equities a 10 percent increase above the average in the
earlier period is associated with a 5 percent steeper fall in the later period.
Higgins and Osler interpret this as suggestive of the existence of bubbles.
Investment and real activity were also sharply curtailed during the latter
period. The fact that the rises and falls occurred during the same period
suggests interlinkages may play a signi￿cant role.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the eﬀect of stock market
interlinkages on asset price bubbles. The theory of bubbles the analysis is
based on was developed in Allen and Gale (2000, 2002). Standard theories
of asset pricing assume that investors purchase assets with their own wealth.
In most ￿nancial systems, this is not the whole story. Intermediation is
important. Many of the agents buying real estate, stocks, and other assets
do so with other people￿s money. The purchase of real estate is usually
debt ￿nanced. If the investment is successful, the borrower repays the loan
and retains the diﬀerence between the value of the asset and the principal
and interest. If the investment is unsuccessful, the borrower has limited
liability and the lender bears the shortfall. Similarly, a large proportion of
stocks are held by mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies.
Money managers also have incentives to take risk. If their investment strategy
is successful, they may be rewarded by a share of the returns, but most
importantly they will attract new investors in the future. Because they
1receive management fees in proportion to the assets under their control, they
will be signi￿cantly better oﬀ as a result of their good performance. If the
investment strategy is unsuccessful, there is a limit to the downside risk that
the manager bears. In the worst case, she will be ￿red but in any case her
liability is limited. Thus, when intermediaries make investment decisions,
the incentive scheme they face has convex payoﬀs.
The agency problem of excessive risk taking associated with limited lia-
bility is crucial for the analysis presented below. If the penalties for default
on debt or the reputational loss from being ￿red from an intermediary are
suﬃciently high then there will not be an incentive to take risks. Hence
the theory can be thought of as applying to cases where these factors are
insuﬃcient to prevent risk taking.
I ft h e r ei sa na g e n c yp r o b l e mo ft h et y p ed e s c r i b e dt h ep e o p l em a k i n g
the investment decisions will have an incentive to take on risky projects.
The fact that lenders are unable to observe the characteristics of a project
means the borrowers can shift risk to the lenders and increase the payoﬀ to
themselves. This causes investors to bid up the prices of risky assets above
their fundamental values and there is a bubble. The more risky the asset the
greater is the amount that can be shifted and the larger the bubble. This
risk can come from two sources. The ￿rst is asset return risk. The second
is ￿nancial risk. This is the risk associated with future ￿nancial conditions
such as the amount of credit that will be available.
It is shown that stock market interlinkages can play an important role in
the evolution of these bubbles. The eﬀect depends on the source of the risk
that underlies the bubble. Suppose two countries with diﬀering amounts of
￿nancial risk are linked together. The impact of the interlinkage is to reduce
the bubble in the country with the larger degree of uncertainty and the higher
asset prices. In the country with less uncertainty and lower asset prices the
eﬀect is to increase the bubble. The eﬀect of the stock market interlinkages
is thus to reduce the dispersion of asset prices. However, when the diﬀerence
is due to riskiness in asset payoﬀst h ee ﬀect of introducing the interlinkage
is the opposite. In this case the high asset price is increased further and
the low asset price is reduced. Thus links can ameliorate or exacerbate the
extent of asset price bubbles.
22 Bubbles and Agency Problems
In many recent cases where asset prices have risen and then collapsed dra-
matically an expansion in credit following ￿nancial liberalization appears to
have been an important factor. Perhaps the best known example of this
type of phenomenon is the dramatic rise in real estate and stock prices that
occurred in Japan in the late 1980￿s and their subsequent collapse in 1990.
Financial liberalization throughout the 1980￿s and the desire to support the
United States dollar in the latter part of the decade led to an expansion
in credit. During most of the 1980￿s asset prices rose steadily, eventually
reaching very high levels. For example, the Nikkei 225 index was around
10,000 in 1985. On December 19, 1989 it reached a peak of 38,916. A new
Governor of the Bank of Japan, less concerned with supporting the US dollar
and more concerned with ￿ghting in￿ation, tightened monetary policy and
this led to a sharp increase in interest rates in early 1990 (see Frankel, 1993;
Tschoegl, 1993). The bubble burst. The Nikkei 225 fell sharply during the
￿rst part of the year and by October 1, 1990 it had sunk to 20,222. Real
estate prices followed a similar pattern. The next few years were marked by
defaults and retrenchment in the ￿nancial system. The real economy was
adversely aﬀected by the aftermath of the bubble and growth rates during
the 1990￿s have mostly been slightly positive or negative, in contrast to most
of the post war period when they were much higher.
Similar events occurred in Norway, Finland and Sweden in the 1980￿s
(see Heiskanen (1993) and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995)). In Norway the
ratio of bank loans to nominal GDP went from 40 percent in 1984 to 68
percent in 1988. Asset prices soared while investment and consumption also
increased signi￿cantly. The collapse in oil prices helped burst the bubble and
caused the most severe banking crisis and recession since the war. In Finland
an expansionary budget in 1987 resulted in massive credit expansion. The
ratio of bank loans to nominal GDP increased from 55 percent in 1984 to 90
percent in 1990. Housing prices rose by a total of 68 percent in 1987 and
1988. In 1989 the central bank increased interest rates and imposed reserve
requirements to moderate credit expansion. In 1990 and 1991 the economic
situation was exacerbated by a fall in trade with the Soviet Union. Asset
prices collapsed, banks had to be supported by the government and GDP
shrank by 7 percent. In Sweden a steady credit expansion through the late
1980￿s led to a property boom. In the fall of 1990 credit was tightened and
interest rates rose. In 1991 a number of banks had severe diﬃculties because
3of lending based on in￿ated asset values. The government had to intervene
and a severe recession followed.
Mexico provides a dramatic illustration of an emerging economy aﬀected
by this type of problem. In the early 1990￿s the banks were privatized and
a ￿nancial liberalization occurred. Perhaps most signi￿cantly, reserve re-
quirements were eliminated. Mishkin (1997) documents how bank credit to
private non￿nancial enterprises went from a level of around 10 percent of
GDP in the late 1980￿s to 40 percent of GDP in 1994. The stock market rose
signi￿cantly during the early 1990￿s. In 1994 the Colosio assassination and
the uprising in Chiapas triggered the collapse of the bubble. The prices of
stocks and other assets fell and banking and foreign exchange crises occurred.
These were followed by a severe recession.
How can bubbles and ensuing crashes such as those in Japan, Scandinavia
and Mexico be understood? The typical sequence of events in such crises is
as follows.
There is initially a ￿nancial liberalization of some sort and this leads to
as i g n i ￿cant expansion in credit. Bank lending increases by a signi￿cant
amount. Some of this lending ￿nances new investment but much of it is
used to buy assets in ￿xed supply such as real estate and stocks. Since the
supply of these assets is ￿xed the prices rise above their ￿fundamentals￿.
Practical problems in short selling such assets prevents the prices from being
bid down as standard theory suggests. The process continues until there is
some real event that means payoﬀs on the assets will be low in the future.
Another possibility is that the central bank is forced to restrict credit because
of fears of ￿overheating￿ and in￿ation. The result of one or both of these
events is that the prices of real estate and stocks collapse. A banking crisis
results because assets valued at ￿bubble￿ prices were used as collateral. There
may be a foreign exchange crisis as investors pull out their funds and the
central bank chooses between trying to ease the banking crisis or protect
the exchange rate. The crises spill over to the real economy and there is a
recession.
In the popular press and academic papers, these bubbles and crises are
often related to the particular features of the country involved. However, the
fact that a similar sequence of events can occur in such widely diﬀering coun-
tries as Japan, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Mexico suggest such bubbles
and crashes are a general phenomenon.
How can this phenomenon be understood? The crucial issues we will
focus on below are:
4(i) What initiates a bubble?
(ii) What is the role of the banking system?
(iii) What causes a bubble to burst?
3 The Risk Shifting Problem
A simple example is developed to illustrate the model in Allen and Gale
(2000).1 T h e yd e v e l o pat h e o r yb a s e do nr a t i o n a lb e h a v i o rt ot r ya n dp r o v i d e
some insight into these issues. Standard models of asset pricing assume
people invest with their own money. We identify the price of an asset in
this benchmark case as the ￿fundamental￿. A bubble is said to occur when
the price of an asset rises above this benchmark.2 If the people making
investment decisions borrow money then because of default they are only
interested in the upper part of the distribution of payoﬀs of the risky asset.
As a result there is a risk shifting problem and the price of the risky asset is
bid up above the benchmark so there is a bubble.
I nt h ee x a m p l et h ep e o p l ew h om a k ei n v e s t m e n td e c i s i o n sd os ow i t h
borrowed money. If they default there is limited liability. Lenders cannot
observe the riskiness of the projects invested in so there is an agency problem.
For the case of real estate this representation of the agency problem is directly
applicable. For the case of stocks there are margin limits that prevent people
directly borrowing and investing in the asset. However, a more appropriate
interpretation in this case is that it is institutional investors making the
investment decisions. This group constitutes a large part of the market in
many countries. The agency problem that occurs is similar to that with a
debt contract. First, the people that supply the funds have little control
over how they are invested. Second, the reward structure is similar to what
happens with a debt contract. If the assets the fund managers invest in
do well, the managers attract more funds in the future and receive higher
payments as a result. If the assets do badly there is a limit to the penalty
that is imposed on the managers. The worse that can happen is that they are
￿red. This is analogous to limited liability (see Allen and Gorton (1993)).
Initially there are two dates t =1 ,2. There are two assets in the example.
1For ease of exposition the example is slightly diﬀerent from the model presented in
the paper.
2See Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) for a discussion of the de￿nition of funda-
mental and bubble.
5The ￿rst is a safe asset in variable supply. For each 1 unit invested in this
a s s e ta td a t e1t h eo u t p u ti s1 .5 at date 2. The second is a risky asset in
￿xed supply that can be thought of as real estate or stocks. There is 1 unit
of this risky asset. For each unit purchased at price P at date 1 the output
is 6 with prob. 0.25 and 1 with prob. 0.75 at date 2 so the expected payoﬀ
is 2.25. The details of the two assets are given in the table below.
Table 1
Asset Supply Investment at date 1 Payoﬀ at date 2
Safe Variable 1 1.5
Risky 1 PR =
(
6w i t hp r o b .0 .25
1w i t hp r o b .0 .75
ER =2 .25
All agents in the model are assumed to be risk neutral.
3.1 The Fundamental
Suppose each investor has wealth 1 initially and invests her own wealth di-












The value of the asset is simply the discounted present value of the payoﬀ
where the discount rate is the opportunity cost of the investor. This is the
classic de￿nition of the fundamental. The benchmark value of the asset is
thus 1.5 and any price above this is termed a bubble.
3.2 Intermediated Case
Suppose next that investors have no wealth of their own. They can borrow
to buy assets at a rate of 331
3 percent. The most they can borrow is 1. If they
borrow 1 they repay 1.33 if they are able to. If they are unable to pay this
6much the lender can claim whatever they have. As explained above lenders
can￿t observe how loans are invested and this leads to an agency problem.
The ￿rst issue is can P =1 .5 be the equilibrium price?
Consider what happens if an investor borrows 1 and invests in the safe
asset.
Marginal return safe asset = 1.5 − 1.33
=0 .17
Suppose instead that she borrows 1 and invests in the risky asset. She
purchases 1/1.5 units. When the payoﬀ is 6 she repays the principal and
interest of 1.33 and keeps what remains. When it is 1 she defaults and the
entire payoﬀ goes to the lender so she receives 0.
Marginal return risky asset = 0.25
￿ 1
1.5
￿ 6 − 1.33
¶
+0 .75 ￿ 0
=0 .25(4 − 1.33)
=0 .67
The risky asset is clearly preferred when P =1 .5s i n c e0 .67 > 0.17. The
expected payoﬀ of 1.5 on the investment in 1 unit of the safe asset is the same
as on the investment of 1/1.5 units of the risky asset. The risky asset is more
attractive to the borrower though. With the safe asset the borrower obtains
0.17 and the lender obtains 1.33. With the risky asset the borrower obtains
0.67 while the lender obtains 0.25￿1.33+0.75￿1￿(1/1.5) = 1.5−0.67 = 0.83.
The risk of default allows 0.5 in expected value to be shifted from the lender
to the borrower. This is the risk shifting problem. If the lender could prevent
the borrower from investing in the risky asset he would do so but he cannot
since this is unobservable.
What is the equilibrium price of the risky asset given this agency problem?
In an equilibrium where the safe asset is used, the price of the risky asset,
P, will be bid up since it is in ￿xed supply, until the expected pro￿to f




￿ 6 − 1.33
¶
+0 .75 ￿ 0=1 .5 − 1.33
so
7P =3 .
There is a bubble with the price of the risky asset above the benchmark of
1.5.
The idea that there is a risk shifting problem when the lender is unable
to observe how the borrower invests the funds is not new (see, e.g., Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). However, it has not
been widely applied in the asset pricing literature. Instead of the standard
result in corporate ￿nance textbooks that debt-￿nanced ￿rms are willing
to accept negative net present value investments, the manifestation of the
agency problem here is that the debt-￿nanced investors are willing to invest
in assets priced above their fundamental.
The amount of risk that is shifted depends on how risky the asset is.
The greater the risk the greater the potential to shift risk and hence the
higher the price will be. To illustrate this consider the previous example
but suppose the payoﬀ on the risky asset is a mean-preserving spread of the
original payoﬀs.
Table 2
Asset Supply Investment at date 1 Payoﬀ at date 2
Risky 1 PR =
(
9w i t hp r o b .0 .25
0w i t hp r o b .0 .75
ER =2 .25




￿ 9 − 1.33
¶
+0 .75 ￿ 0=1 .5 − 1.33
so
P =4 .5.
More risk is shifted and as a result the price of the risky asset is bid up to
an even higher level.
It is interesting to note that in both the stock market boom of the 1920￿s
and the one in the 1990￿s the stocks that did best were ￿high-tech￿ stocks.
In the 1920￿s it was radio stocks and utilities that were the star performers
8(see White (1990)). In the 1990￿s it was telecommunications, media and
entertainment and technology stocks that did the best. It is precisely these
stocks which have the most uncertain payoﬀs because of the nature of the
business they are in.
One of the crucial issues is why the banks are willing to lend to the in-
vestors given the chance of default. To see this consider again the case where
the payoﬀs on the risky asset are those in Table 1 and P =3 . I nt h i s
case the quantity of the risky asset purchased when somebody borrows 1 is
1/P =1 /3. In the equilibria considered above the investors are indiﬀerent
between investing in the safe and risky asset. Suppose for the sake of il-
lustration the ￿x e ds u p p l yo ft h er i s k ya s s e ti s4 /3. The amount of funds
depositors have is 10 and the number of borrowers is 10. In the equilibrium
where P = 3, 4 of the borrowers invest in the risky asset and 6 in the safe
in order for the ￿xed supply of 4/3 units of the risky asset to be taken up.
In this case 40 percent of borrowers are in risky assets and 60 percent are in
safe assets. A bank￿s expected payoﬀ from lending one unit is then given by
the following expression.
Bank￿s Expected Payoﬀ =0 .4[0.25 ￿ 1.33 + 0.75 ￿ (1/3) ￿ 1] + 0.6[1.33]
=1 .03.
The ￿rst term is the payoﬀ to the bank from the 40 percent of investors in the
risky asset. If the payoﬀ is 6, which occurs with probability 0.25, the loan
a n di n t e r e s ti sr e p a i di nf u l l . I ft h ep a y o ﬀ is 1 which occurs with probability
0.75,the borrower defaults and the bank receives the entire proceeds from the
1/3 unit owned by the borrower. The payoﬀ is thus (1/3)￿1. The 60 percent
of investors in the safe asset are able to pay oﬀ their loan and interest of 1.33
in full.
If the banking sector is competitive the receipts from lending, 1.03, will
be paid out to depositors. In this case it is the depositors that bear the cost
of the agency problem. In order for this allocation to be feasible markets
must be segmented. The depositors and the banks must not have access to
the assets that the investors who borrow invest in. Clearly if they did they
would be better oﬀ to just invest in the safe asset rather than put their money
in the bank or lend to the investors.
94 Credit and Interest Rate Determination
T h eq u a n t i t yo fc r e d i ta n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t eh a v es of a rb e e nt a k e na se x o g e -
nous. These factors are incorporated in the example next to illustrate the
relationship between the amount of credit and the level of interest rates. We
start with the simplest case where the central bank determines the aggregate
amount of credit B available to banks. It does this by setting reserve require-
ments and determining the amount of assets available for use as reserves. For
ease of exposition we do not fully model this process and simply assume the
central bank sets B. The banking sector is competitive. The number of
banks is normalized at 1 and the number of investors is also normalized to
1. Each investor will therefore be able to borrow B from each bank.
The safe asset pays a ￿xed return r to the investor: if x is invested in
the safe asset at date 1 the return is rx at date 2. The safe asset can be
interpreted in a number of ways. One possibility is that it is debt issued by
the corporate sector. Another possibility is that it is capital goods which
are leased to the corporate sector. The investors treat the rate of return as
￿xed because they are small relative to the size of the corporate sector. In
equilibrium, competition will ensure that the rate of return on the bonds
or the capital goods leased to the corporate sector is equal to the marginal
product of capital.
The return on the safe asset is determined by the marginal product of
capital in the economy. This in turn depends on the amount of the consump-
tion good x that is invested at date 1 in the economy￿s productive technology
to produce f(x) units at date 2. The total amount that can be invested is B
and the amount that is invested at date 1 in the risky asset since there is 1
unit is P. Hence the date 1 budget constraint implies that
x = B − P.
It is assumed
f(x)=3 ( B − P)
0.5. (1)
Provided the market for loans is competitive the interest rate r will be bid
up by investors until
r = f
0(B − P)=1 .5(B − P)
−0.5. (2)
At this level the safe asset will not yield any pro￿ts for investors. If it was
lower than this there would be an in￿nite demand for the safe asset and if it
was higher than this there would be zero demand.
10The amount the investors will be prepared to pay for the risky asset




￿ 6 − r
¶
+0 .75 ￿ 0=0 .
Using (2) in this,
P =4 ( B − P)
0.5.
Solving for P gives
P =8 ( −1+
√
1+0 .25B). (3)
When B =5t h e nP =4a n dr =1 .5. The relationship between P and B is
shown by the solid line in Figure 1. By controlling the amount of credit the
central bank controls the level of interest rates and the level of asset prices.
Note that this relationship is diﬀerent from that in the standard asset pricing





This case is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 1. A comparison of the
two cases shows that the fundamental is relatively insensitive to the amount
of credit compared to the case where there is an agency problem. Changes
in aggregate credit can cause relatively large changes in asset prices when
there is an agency problem.
5 Financial Risk
The previous section assumed that the central bank could determine the
amount of credit B. In practice the central bank has limited ability to control
the amount of credit and this means B is random. In addition there may
be changes of policy preferences, changes of administration, and changes in
the external environment which create further uncertainty about the level of
B. This uncertainty is particularly great in countries undergoing ￿nancial
liberalization. In order to investigate the eﬀect of this uncertainty an extra
p e r i o di sa d d e dt ot h em o d e l .B e t w e e nd a t e s1a n d2e v e r y t h i n gi st h es a m e
as before. Between dates 0 and 1 the only uncertainty that is resolved is
about the level of B at date 1. Thus between dates 0 and 1 there is ￿nancial
uncertainty. The uncertainty about aggregate credit B at date 1 causes
11uncertainty about prices at date 1. Given that investors are borrowing from
banks at date 0 in the same way as before this price uncertainty again leads
to an agency problem and risk shifting. The price of the risky asset at date
0 will re￿ect this price uncertainty and can lead the asset price to be even
higher than at date 1.
Suppose that there is a 0.5 probability that B =5a n da0 .5 probability
that B =7a td a t e1 . Then using (2) and (3) the prices and interest rates
are as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Probability B P r
0.55 4 1 .5
0.57 5 .27 1.14




￿ 5.27 − r0
¶
+0 .5 ￿ 0=0 ,
where r0, the date 0 interest rate, is given by (2) with B and P replaced by






Taking B0 = 6 and solving for r0 and P0 gives
r0 =1 .19
P0 =4 .42.
As when the uncertainty is due to variations in asset payoﬀs, the greater
the ￿nancial uncertainty the greater is P0. Consider a mean preserving spread
on the ￿nancial uncertainty so that Table 3 is replaced by Table 4.
Table 4
Probability B P r
0.54 3 .14 1.81
0.58 5 .86 1.03
12In this case it can be shown
r0 =1 .27
P0 =4 .61.
The risk shifting eﬀect operates for ￿nancial risk in the same way as it
does for asset payoﬀ risk. Although the expected payoﬀ at date 2 is only 2.25
the price of the risky asset at date 1 in the last case is 4.61. The possibility
of credit expansion over a period of years may create a great deal of uncer-
tainty about how high the bubble may go and when it may collapse. This is
particularly true when economies are undergoing ￿nancial liberalization. As
more periods are added it is possible for the bubble to become very large.
The market price can be much greater than the fundamental.
These examples illustrate that what is important in determining the risky
asset￿s price at date 0 is expectations about aggregate credit at date 1. If
aggregate credit goes up then asset prices will be high and default will be
avoided. However, if aggregate credit goes down then asset prices will be
low and default will occur. The issue here is what is the dynamic path of
aggregate credit. The point is that the expectation of credit expansion is
already taken into account in the investors￿ decisions about how much to
borrow and how much to pay for the risky asset. If credit expansion is less
than expected, or perhaps simply falls short of the highest anticipated levels,
the investors may not be able to repay their loans and default occurs. In
Allen and Gale (2000) it is shown that even if credit is always expanded then
there may still be default. In fact it is shown that there are situations where
the amount of credit will be arbitrarily close to the upper bound of what is
anticipated and widespread default is almost inevitable.
6 Stock Market Interlinkages
So far we have considered what happens in single countries. We next turn
to the case where there are multiple stock markets and interlinkages between
them. Initially, we start by investigating the eﬀect of interlinkages between
countries with diﬀerent levels of ￿nancial risk and then go on to the case
where the countries have diﬀerent variability in asset payoﬀs. It turns out
that the interlinkages have quite diﬀerent eﬀects in the two situations.
136.1 Diﬀerent Levels of Financial Risk
The case considered is where the interest rate is endogenously determined as
i nS e c t i o n5a n dt h e r ei s￿nancial risk due to uncertain levels of credit.
Suppose there are two countries, X and Y. Countries X and Y have the
same parameters as those analyzed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Country
Xh a sa0 .5 probability that B =5a n da0 .5 probability B = 7. Country Y
has a 0.5 probability that B =4a n da0 .5 probability B = 8. Country X
thus has lower ￿nancial risk than Country Y. The realizations of the amounts
of credit in each country are assumed to be independent. The interest rates
and prices when the countries are autarchic are as in Section 5. At date
0, they are rX0 =1 .19 and PX0 =4 .42 in Country X , and rY 0 =1 .27 and
PY 0 =4 .61 in Country Y. The low risk country has lower interest rates and
prices than the high risk country.
If the two countries have links between the stock markets so they are
eﬀectively like one market then interest rates must be equalized. Since both
risky assets have the same distribution of payoﬀs at date 2 they will have the
same price as well. The total credit available will be split equally between
the countries. Table 5 shows the four possible outcomes at date 1 for prices
and interest rates.
Table 5
Probability BX BY (BX + BY)( BX + BY)/2 Pr
0.25 5 4 9 4.53 .66 1.64
0.25 7 4 11 5.54 .33 1.39
0.25 5 8 13 6.54 .96 1.21
0.25 7 8 15 7.55 .57 1.08
It can be shown in the usual way that if B0 = 6 in each country then
r0 =1 .23
P0 =4 .52.
The eﬀect of the interlinkages here is that Country X experiences higher
asset prices and interest rates and Country Y lower asset prices and interest
rates than before. The eﬀect of interlinkages is to moderate the bubbles.
Asset prices lie between those that would occur without the interlinkages.
This is due to the fact that the variations in credit across countries are
smoothed.
146.2 Diﬀerences in Asset Payoﬀs
Next suppose that Country X is as before. Country Y has the same credit
distribution as Country X. Both have a 0.5 probability that B =5a n da
0.5 probability that B = 7. The realizations of the level of credit in each
country at date 1 are independent. The diﬀerence between the countries is
now that the payoﬀs at date 2 on the risky asset in Country Y are now given
by Table 2 rather than Table 1. The payoﬀso nC o u n t r yY ￿ sa s s e t sa r em o r e
risky than the payoﬀsC o u n t r yX ￿ sa s s e t s .
When Country Y is autarchic it can be shown in the usual way that the
price distribution at date 1 is
Table 6
Probability BP r
0.55 4 .45 2.02
0.57 6 1 .5
and at date 0
rY 0 =1 .29
PY 0 =4 .64.
This contrasts with Country X where rX0 =1 .19 and PX0 =4 .42. Since the
payoﬀs in Country Y are more variable than in Country X the price of the
risky asset is higher. Given r = f0(B − P) if the price is higher the interest
rate is also higher since f
00 < 0.
When stock market interlinkages are introduced the eﬀe c ti sr a t h e rd i f -
ferent in this case than in the previous example. It can be shown as before
that at date 1
Table 7
Probability BX BY (BX + BY)/2 PX PY r
0.25 5 5 5 3.42 5.12 1.76
0.25 5 7 6 4 6 1.5
0.25 7 5 6 4 6 1.5
0.25 7 7 7 4.56 6.84 1.31
and at date 0
15r0 =1 .25
PX0 =3 .65
PY 0 =5 .47
Here the eﬀect of introducing stock market interlinkages is to exacerbate
the bubble in the country with the high autarchic asset price and reduce
it in the other country. At date 1, the higher price in Country Y drives
up the interest rate relative to Country X￿s autarchic allocation and this
drives down the price of the risky asset in Country X. Relative to Country
Y￿s autarchic case the interest rate is lower and this drives up the price of
the risky asset for Country Y. At date 0 interest rates are again higher for
Country X and lower for Country Y and this reinforces the fall in the price
of Country X￿s risky asset and the increase in the price of Country Y￿s risky
asset. In contrast to the case with diﬀering levels of credit risk the bubble
in the country with the highest risky asset price is increased.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has suggested that one basic reason for the existence of posi-
tive bubbles is an agency problem. Many investors in real estate and stock
markets obtain their investment funds from external sources. If the ultimate
providers of funds are unable to observe the characteristics of the investment,
there is a classic risk shifting problem. Risk shifting increases the return to
investment in risky assets and causes investors to bid up prices above their
fundamental values. A crucial determinant of asset prices is thus the amount
of credit that is provided for speculative investment. Financial liberalization,
by expanding the volume of credit for speculative investments and creating
uncertainty about the future path of credit expansion, can interact with the
agency problem and lead to a bubble in asset prices. In addition it was
shown that stock market interlinkages can have a signi￿cant eﬀect on asset
price bubbles that arise from agency problems. Depending on the form of
risk that leads to risk shifting introducing interlinkages can either reduce or
increase the extent of bubbles.
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